merge key_state->authenticated and key_state->auth_deferred

Both are tightly coupled often both are checked at the same time.
Merging them into one state makes the code simpler and also brings
us closer in the direction of a state machine

Signed-off-by: Arne Schwabe <arne@rfc2549.org>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Message-Id: <20200706163516.11390-2-arne@rfc2549.org>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg20216.html
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>

1 files changed, 14 insertions, 13 deletions

diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c b/src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c
index 68c39c6..e28f1f3 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c
+++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ tls_deauthenticate(struct tls_multi *multi)
         {
             for (int j = 0; j < KS_SIZE; ++j)
             {
-                multi->session[i].key[j].authenticated = false;
+                multi->session[i].key[j].authenticated = KS_AUTH_FALSE;
             }
         }
     }
@@ -950,7 +950,7 @@ tls_authentication_status(struct tls_multi *multi, const int latency)
             if (DECRYPT_KEY_ENABLED(multi, ks))
             {
                 active = true;
-                if (ks->authenticated)
+                if (ks->authenticated != KS_AUTH_FALSE)
                 {
 #ifdef ENABLE_DEF_AUTH
                     unsigned int s1 = ACF_DISABLED;
@@ -967,7 +967,7 @@ tls_authentication_status(struct tls_multi *multi, const int latency)
                         case ACF_SUCCEEDED:
                         case ACF_DISABLED:
                             success = true;
-                            ks->auth_deferred = false;
+                            ks->authenticated = KS_AUTH_TRUE;
                             break;
 
                         case ACF_UNDEFINED:
@@ -978,7 +978,7 @@ tls_authentication_status(struct tls_multi *multi, const int latency)
                             break;
 
                         case ACF_FAILED:
-                            ks->authenticated = false;
+                            ks->authenticated = KS_AUTH_FALSE;
                             break;
 
                         default:
@@ -1308,7 +1308,7 @@ verify_user_pass(struct user_pass *up, struct tls_multi *multi,
         else
         {
             wipe_auth_token(multi);
-            ks->authenticated = false;
+            ks->authenticated = KS_AUTH_FALSE;
             msg(M_WARN, "TLS: Username/auth-token authentication "
                 "failed for username '%s'", up->username);
             return;
@@ -1354,17 +1354,17 @@ verify_user_pass(struct user_pass *up, struct tls_multi *multi,
 #endif
         && tls_lock_username(multi, up->username))
     {
-        ks->authenticated = true;
+        ks->authenticated = KS_AUTH_TRUE;
 #ifdef PLUGIN_DEF_AUTH
         if (s1 == OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_DEFERRED)
         {
-            ks->auth_deferred = true;
+            ks->authenticated = KS_AUTH_DEFERRED;
         }
 #endif
 #ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH
         if (man_def_auth != KMDA_UNDEF)
         {
-            ks->auth_deferred = true;
+            ks->authenticated = KS_AUTH_DEFERRED;
         }
 #endif
         if ((session->opt->ssl_flags & SSLF_USERNAME_AS_COMMON_NAME))
@@ -1416,7 +1416,7 @@ verify_user_pass(struct user_pass *up, struct tls_multi *multi,
         }
 #ifdef ENABLE_DEF_AUTH
         msg(D_HANDSHAKE, "TLS: Username/Password authentication %s for username '%s' %s",
-            ks->auth_deferred ? "deferred" : "succeeded",
+            (ks->authenticated == KS_AUTH_DEFERRED) ? "deferred" : "succeeded",
             up->username,
             (session->opt->ssl_flags & SSLF_USERNAME_AS_COMMON_NAME) ? "[CN SET]" : "");
 #else
@@ -1428,6 +1428,7 @@ verify_user_pass(struct user_pass *up, struct tls_multi *multi,
     }
     else
     {
+        ks->authenticated = KS_AUTH_FALSE;
         msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Auth Error: Auth Username/Password verification failed for peer");
     }
 }
@@ -1444,7 +1445,7 @@ verify_final_auth_checks(struct tls_multi *multi, struct tls_session *session)
     }
 
     /* Don't allow the CN to change once it's been locked */
-    if (ks->authenticated && multi->locked_cn)
+    if (ks->authenticated != KS_AUTH_FALSE && multi->locked_cn)
     {
         const char *cn = session->common_name;
         if (cn && strcmp(cn, multi->locked_cn))
@@ -1460,7 +1461,7 @@ verify_final_auth_checks(struct tls_multi *multi, struct tls_session *session)
     }
 
     /* Don't allow the cert hashes to change once they have been locked */
-    if (ks->authenticated && multi->locked_cert_hash_set)
+    if (ks->authenticated != KS_AUTH_FALSE && multi->locked_cert_hash_set)
     {
         const struct cert_hash_set *chs = session->cert_hash_set;
         if (chs && !cert_hash_compare(chs, multi->locked_cert_hash_set))
@@ -1474,7 +1475,7 @@ verify_final_auth_checks(struct tls_multi *multi, struct tls_session *session)
     }
 
     /* verify --client-config-dir based authentication */
-    if (ks->authenticated && session->opt->client_config_dir_exclusive)
+    if (ks->authenticated != KS_AUTH_FALSE && session->opt->client_config_dir_exclusive)
     {
         struct gc_arena gc = gc_new();
 
@@ -1483,7 +1484,7 @@ verify_final_auth_checks(struct tls_multi *multi, struct tls_session *session)
                                              cn, &gc);
         if (!cn || !strcmp(cn, CCD_DEFAULT) || !platform_test_file(path))
         {
-            ks->authenticated = false;
+            ks->authenticated = KS_AUTH_FALSE;
             wipe_auth_token(multi);
             msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Auth Error: --client-config-dir authentication failed for common name '%s' file='%s'",
                 session->common_name,