From 6c8161d69fe9fce0f862b678aaa84866aaaeff8f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Andersen
Date: Wed, 5 May 2004 07:05:32 +0000
Subject: Steve Grubb writes:

Hello,

Last November a bug was found in iproute. CAN-2003-0856 has more information.
Basically, netlink packets can come from any user. If a program performs action
based on netlink packets, they must be examined to make sure they came from the
place they are expected (the kernel).

Attached is a patch against pre8. Please apply this before releasing 1.00 final.
All users of busy box may be vulnerable to local attacks without it.

Best Regards,
Steve Grubb
---
 networking/libiproute/libnetlink.c | 6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'networking/libiproute')

diff --git a/networking/libiproute/libnetlink.c b/networking/libiproute/libnetlink.c
index 861daef..5545be8 100644
--- a/networking/libiproute/libnetlink.c
+++ b/networking/libiproute/libnetlink.c
@@ -161,7 +161,8 @@ int rtnl_dump_filter(struct rtnl_handle *rth,
 		while (NLMSG_OK(h, status)) {
 			int err;
 
-			if (h->nlmsg_pid != rth->local.nl_pid ||
+			if (nladdr.nl_pid != 0 ||
+			    h->nlmsg_pid != rth->local.nl_pid ||
 			    h->nlmsg_seq != rth->dump) {
 				if (junk) {
 					err = junk(&nladdr, h, arg2);
@@ -270,7 +271,8 @@ int rtnl_talk(struct rtnl_handle *rtnl, struct nlmsghdr *n, pid_t peer,
 				bb_error_msg_and_die("!!!malformed message: len=%d", len);
 			}
 
-			if (h->nlmsg_pid != rtnl->local.nl_pid ||
+			if (nladdr.nl_pid != peer ||
+			    h->nlmsg_pid != rtnl->local.nl_pid ||
 			    h->nlmsg_seq != seq) {
 				if (junk) {
 					l_err = junk(&nladdr, h, jarg);
-- 
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