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Diffstat (limited to 'libbb/copy_file.c')
-rw-r--r--libbb/copy_file.c37
1 files changed, 29 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/libbb/copy_file.c b/libbb/copy_file.c
index d37d515..3b83e12 100644
--- a/libbb/copy_file.c
+++ b/libbb/copy_file.c
@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ int copy_file(const char *source, const char *dest, int flags)
signed char dest_exists = 0;
signed char ovr;
+/* Inverse of cp -d ("cp without -d") */
#define FLAGS_DEREF (flags & FILEUTILS_DEREFERENCE)
if ((FLAGS_DEREF ? stat : lstat)(source, &source_stat) < 0) {
@@ -229,12 +230,22 @@ int copy_file(const char *source, const char *dest, int flags)
return 0;
}
- if (S_ISREG(source_stat.st_mode)
- /* DEREF uses stat, which never returns S_ISLNK() == true. */
+ if (/* "cp thing1 thing2" without -R: just open and read() from thing1 */
+ !(flags & FILEUTILS_RECUR)
+ /* "cp [-opts] regular_file thing2" */
+ || S_ISREG(source_stat.st_mode)
+ /* DEREF uses stat, which never returns S_ISLNK() == true.
+ * So the below is never true: */
/* || (FLAGS_DEREF && S_ISLNK(source_stat.st_mode)) */
) {
int src_fd;
int dst_fd;
+ mode_t new_mode;
+
+ if (!FLAGS_DEREF && S_ISLNK(source_stat.st_mode)) {
+ /* "cp -d symlink dst": create a link */
+ goto dont_cat;
+ }
if (ENABLE_FEATURE_PRESERVE_HARDLINKS && !FLAGS_DEREF) {
const char *link_target;
@@ -258,18 +269,24 @@ int copy_file(const char *source, const char *dest, int flags)
if (src_fd < 0)
return -1;
+ /* Do not try to open with weird mode fields */
+ new_mode = source_stat.st_mode;
+ if (!S_ISREG(source_stat.st_mode))
+ new_mode = 0666;
+
/* POSIX way is a security problem versus symlink attacks,
* we do it only for non-symlinks, and only for non-recursive,
* non-interactive cp. NB: it is still racy
* for "cp file /home/bad_user/file" case
* (user can rm file and create a link to /etc/passwd) */
if (DO_POSIX_CP
- || (dest_exists && !(flags & (FILEUTILS_RECUR|FILEUTILS_INTERACTIVE))
+ || (dest_exists
+ && !(flags & (FILEUTILS_RECUR|FILEUTILS_INTERACTIVE))
&& !S_ISLNK(dest_stat.st_mode))
) {
- dst_fd = open(dest, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, source_stat.st_mode);
+ dst_fd = open(dest, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, new_mode);
} else /* safe way: */
- dst_fd = open(dest, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, source_stat.st_mode);
+ dst_fd = open(dest, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, new_mode);
if (dst_fd == -1) {
ovr = ask_and_unlink(dest, flags);
if (ovr <= 0) {
@@ -277,7 +294,7 @@ int copy_file(const char *source, const char *dest, int flags)
return ovr;
}
/* It shouldn't exist. If it exists, do not open (symlink attack?) */
- dst_fd = open3_or_warn(dest, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, source_stat.st_mode);
+ dst_fd = open3_or_warn(dest, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, new_mode);
if (dst_fd < 0) {
close(src_fd);
return -1;
@@ -285,8 +302,7 @@ int copy_file(const char *source, const char *dest, int flags)
}
#if ENABLE_SELINUX
- if (((flags & FILEUTILS_PRESERVE_SECURITY_CONTEXT)
- || (flags & FILEUTILS_SET_SECURITY_CONTEXT))
+ if ((flags & (FILEUTILS_PRESERVE_SECURITY_CONTEXT|FILEUTILS_SET_SECURITY_CONTEXT))
&& is_selinux_enabled() > 0
) {
security_context_t con;
@@ -313,8 +329,13 @@ int copy_file(const char *source, const char *dest, int flags)
}
/* ...but read size is already checked by bb_copyfd_eof */
close(src_fd);
+ /* "cp /dev/something new_file" should not
+ * copy mode of /dev/something */
+ if (!S_ISREG(source_stat.st_mode))
+ return retval;
goto preserve_mode_ugid_time;
}
+ dont_cat:
/* Source is a symlink or a special file */
/* We are lazy here, a bit lax with races... */