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| author | Steffan Karger | 2017-05-22 15:54:13 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Gert Doering | 2017-06-13 09:36:10 +0200 |
| commit | e6bf7e033d063535a4414a4cf49c8f367ecdbb4f (patch) | |
| tree | 1c25b10db88a8c6a777d126f260a899e4823d4b0 /src/openvpn/otime.h | |
| parent | 534c8f24bd8ceeaebb326f53363a4e40e970df1e (diff) | |
| download | openvpn-e6bf7e033d063535a4414a4cf49c8f367ecdbb4f.zip openvpn-e6bf7e033d063535a4414a4cf49c8f367ecdbb4f.tar.gz | |
openssl: fix overflow check for long --tls-cipher option
The length check in tls_ctx_restrict_ciphers() did not check for overflow,
which could lead to a stack buffer overflow.
This has no real-world impact, because --tls-cipher can only be specified
by entities that are allowed to supply config settings. Since those
entities can also change --script-security and call scripts and/or
plugins, these users already have code execution at the level of the
openvpn process. In other words: the attacker would not gain any
capabilities. Nevertheless, a nasty bug that we should fix.
This bug was discovered and reported to the OpenVPN security team by
Guido Vranken.
Signed-off-by: Steffan Karger <steffan.karger@fox-it.com>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Message-Id: <1495461253-20111-1-git-send-email-steffan.karger@fox-it.com>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg14716.html
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Diffstat (limited to 'src/openvpn/otime.h')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions