Revert commit 423ced962d

This reverts commit 423ced962db3129b4ed551c489624faba4340652, which
has Jason A. Donenfeld listed as author as the patch was based on his
initial submission.

We have not received permission to relicense the original patch.

Change-Id: I8142753928498169032450c56d0497a5042bdc9b
Signed-off-by: Arne Schwabe <arne@rfc2549.org>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Message-Id: <20230524132424.3098475-1-arne@rfc2549.org>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg26722.html
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
(cherry picked from commit 370334828659e205941eecd1c90f085a64ca539d)

6 files changed, 14 insertions, 33 deletions

diff --git a/src/openvpn/init.c b/src/openvpn/init.c
index d358ad0..c023b33 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/init.c
+++ b/src/openvpn/init.c
@@ -3347,7 +3347,6 @@ do_init_crypto_tls(struct context *c, const unsigned int flags)
     to.verify_hash = options->verify_hash;
     to.verify_hash_algo = options->verify_hash_algo;
     to.verify_hash_depth = options->verify_hash_depth;
-    to.verify_hash_no_ca = options->verify_hash_no_ca;
 #ifdef ENABLE_X509ALTUSERNAME
     memcpy(to.x509_username_field, options->x509_username_field, sizeof(to.x509_username_field));
 #else
diff --git a/src/openvpn/options.c b/src/openvpn/options.c
index efddc58..6d8ae57 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/options.c
+++ b/src/openvpn/options.c
@@ -2989,11 +2989,21 @@ options_postprocess_verify_ce(const struct options *options,
         else
         {
 #ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO_MBEDTLS
+            if (!(options->ca_file))
+            {
+                msg(M_USAGE, "You must define CA file (--ca)");
+            }
+
             if (options->ca_path)
             {
                 msg(M_USAGE, "Parameter --capath cannot be used with the mbed TLS version version of OpenVPN.");
             }
-#endif  /* ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO_MBEDTLS */
+#else  /* ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO_MBEDTLS */
+            if ((!(options->ca_file)) && (!(options->ca_path)))
+            {
+                msg(M_USAGE, "You must define CA file (--ca) or CA path (--capath)");
+            }
+#endif
             if (pull)
             {
 
@@ -3725,13 +3735,6 @@ options_postprocess_mutate(struct options *o, struct env_set *es)
         options_postprocess_http_proxy_override(o);
     }
 #endif
-    if (!o->ca_file && !o->ca_path && o->verify_hash
-        && o->verify_hash_depth == 0)
-    {
-        msg(M_INFO, "Using certificate fingerprint to verify peer (no CA "
-            "option set). ");
-        o->verify_hash_no_ca = true;
-    }
 
     if (o->config && streq(o->config, "stdin") && o->remap_sigusr1 == SIGHUP)
     {
@@ -4027,11 +4030,8 @@ options_postprocess_filechecks(struct options *options)
     errs |= check_file_access_inline(options->dh_file_inline, CHKACC_FILE,
                                      options->dh_file, R_OK, "--dh");
 
-    if (!options->verify_hash_no_ca)
-    {
-        errs |= check_file_access_inline(options->ca_file_inline, CHKACC_FILE,
-                                         options->ca_file, R_OK, "--ca");
-    }
+    errs |= check_file_access_inline(options->ca_file_inline, CHKACC_FILE,
+                                     options->ca_file, R_OK, "--ca");
 
     errs |= check_file_access_chroot(options->chroot_dir, CHKACC_FILE,
                                      options->ca_path, R_OK, "--capath");
diff --git a/src/openvpn/options.h b/src/openvpn/options.h
index f5890b9..95f1158 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/options.h
+++ b/src/openvpn/options.h
@@ -604,7 +604,6 @@ struct options
     struct verify_hash_list *verify_hash;
     hash_algo_type verify_hash_algo;
     int verify_hash_depth;
-    bool verify_hash_no_ca;
     unsigned int ssl_flags; /* set to SSLF_x flags from ssl.h */
 
 #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_common.h b/src/openvpn/ssl_common.h
index 27b0294..c0b3caa 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/ssl_common.h
+++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_common.h
@@ -345,7 +345,6 @@ struct tls_options
     const char *remote_cert_eku;
     struct verify_hash_list *verify_hash;
     int verify_hash_depth;
-    bool verify_hash_no_ca;
     hash_algo_type verify_hash_algo;
 #ifdef ENABLE_X509ALTUSERNAME
     char *x509_username_field[MAX_PARMS];
diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_mbedtls.c b/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_mbedtls.c
index e3437f7..c9ef7a1 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_mbedtls.c
+++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_mbedtls.c
@@ -62,22 +62,6 @@ verify_callback(void *session_obj, mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, int cert_depth,
     struct buffer cert_fingerprint = x509_get_sha256_fingerprint(cert, &gc);
     cert_hash_remember(session, cert_depth, &cert_fingerprint);
 
-    if (session->opt->verify_hash_no_ca)
-    {
-        /*
-         * If we decide to verify the peer certificate based on the fingerprint
-         * we ignore wrong dates and the certificate not being trusted.
-         * Any other problem with the certificate (wrong key, bad cert,...)
-         * will still trigger an error.
-         * Clearing these flags relies on verify_cert will later rejecting a
-         * certificate that has no matching fingerprint.
-         */
-        uint32_t flags_ignore = MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED
-                                | MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED
-                                | MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE;
-        *flags = *flags & ~flags_ignore;
-    }
-
     /* did peer present cert which was signed by our root cert? */
     if (*flags != 0)
     {
diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_openssl.c b/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_openssl.c
index e24ce4e..ac36f09 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_openssl.c
+++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_openssl.c
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ verify_callback(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
     cert_hash_remember(session, X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx), &cert_hash);
 
     /* did peer present cert which was signed by our root cert? */
-    if (!preverify_ok && !session->opt->verify_hash_no_ca)
+    if (!preverify_ok)
     {
         /* get the X509 name */
         char *subject = x509_get_subject(current_cert, &gc);